ABSTRACT Fairtrade International certification is the primary social certification in the agro-food sector intended to promote the well-being and empowerment of farmers and workers in the Global South. Although Fairtrade's farmer program is well studied, far less is known about its labor certification. Helping fill this gap, this article provides a systematic account of Fairtrade's labor certification system and standards and compares it to four other voluntary programs addressing labor conditions in global agro-export sectors. The study explains how Fairtrade International institutionalizes its equity and empowerment goals in its labor certification system and its recently revised labor standards. Drawing on critiques of compliance-based labor standards programs and proposals regarding the central features of a 'beyond compliance' approach, the inquiry focuses on Fairtrade's efforts to promote inclusive governance, participatory oversight, and enabling rights.
audit reports, but it does not require the democratic worker representation that most labor scholars and activists see as essential in undergirding enabling rights (Anner ; Compa ) .
While Fairtrade International's labor certification makes important advances in its worker-enabling compliance approach, I argue that it, like other agricultural labor standards systems, faces critical challenges. Fairtrade, like other voluntary programs, faces substantial problems in implementing its labor standards and realizing its empowerment objectives, particularly in the many contexts in which it operates that lack strong labor legislation and civil society institutions. As I conclude, voluntary regulations may be able to augment, but they cannot replace, mandatory legal protections upholding labor and citizenship rights.
V O L U N T A R Y C E R T I F I C A T I O N P R O G R A M S , L A B O R S T A N D A R D S , A N D F A I R T R A D E
Development scholars have analyzed the emergence, organization, potential, and pitfalls of voluntary certification programs. A growing number of voluntary initiatives take on governance functions previously left to the state, regulating social and environmental conditions in global manufacturing and agriculture (Berliner et al. ; Fransen ; ITC ) . Many of these are multi-stakeholder initiatives coordinated by NGOs which involve businesses, civil society, and sometimes government agencies. Multi-stakeholder labor standards systems seek to shore up global work conditions undermined by the inability of national labor laws to oversee globalized production, by the non-enforceability of International Labour Organization standards, and by the declining power of unions (Appelbaum and Lichtenstein ; Mayer and Gereffi ; O'Rourke ).
Research on multi-stakeholder programs explains how voluntary initiatives regulate market activities using standards to specify production expectations, certification to oversee compliance, and labels to reward participation (Auld ; Berliner et al. ; Potoski and Prakash ) . Scholars highlight how social movements promote private regulation by galvanizing public concern over global production conditions and helping shape new programs (Boström and Tamm Hallström ; Fransen ) . Advocacy efforts have spotlighted labor issues, targeting practices deemed unacceptable, like "sweatshop" conditions (Bartley and Child ) , and endorsing preferred practices, like "decent work" (Barrientos, Gereffi, and Rossi ) . These alternative normative definitions challenge the mainstream market and industrial "conventions" guiding economic expectations and activities (Boltanski and Thévenot ) . As Thévenot () argues, certification programs advance new conventions, using standards as a mechanism to reflect and reinforce specified normative commitments and associated political economic practices and institutions.
An extensive literature on voluntary labor standards programs in manufacturing documents the prevalence of a top-down compliance approach to regulation, grounded in bureaucratic standards, external auditing, and penalties. Most research finds that this approach brings limited improvements for workers, since it may identify factory violations but rarely fixes them (Anner ; Barrientos and Smith ; Berliner et al. ; Compa ; Esbenshade , ; Fransen ). As Locke and colleagues demonstrate, programs pursuing this compliance approach, as well as those adopting a capability-building approach to enhancing factories' ability to make shop-floor improvements, lead to uneven gains since they fail to address the underlying causes of poor labor conditions (Locke ; Locke, Amengual, and Mangla ) .
Scholars argue that to bring significant gains to workers in the Global South, voluntary labor standards programs must pursue a beyond-compliance approach rooted in worker empowerment. This type of approach-what Rodríguez-Garavito () calls "empowered participatory labor regulation"-addresses three central weaknesses in the compliance model. () In their governance, scholars argue that programs must include substantial civil society engagement to offset corporate interests, integrating often marginalized program beneficiaries (Rodríguez-Garavito ) as well as unions, worker organizations, and allied groups (Anner ; Barrientos and Smith ; Compa ; Fransen ). () In their oversight, researchers propose that relying on outside certifiers to ensure compliance via auditing and violation penalties is insufficient and must be augmented by participatory oversight by workers and unions (Anner ; Compa ; Rodríguez-Garavito ) and local civil society organizations (Barrientos and Smith ; Esbenshade ; Fransen ).
() In their standards, scholars argue that programs must go beyond workplace protections (like occupational, health, and safety) to promote enabling rights through individual capacity building and collective organizing (Appelbaum and Lichtenstein ; Anner ; Barrientos and Smith ; Compa ; Esbenshade ; Rodríguez-Garavito ).
While scholars argue that more inclusive governance, participatory oversight, and enabling rights can strengthen labor standards systems, most agree that national conditions are key to program success. Research finds that worker gains from factory certification are contingent on robust labor laws, political will, and government capacity as well as supportive labor and civil society organizations (Amengual and Chirot ; Appelbaum and Lichtenstein ; Berliner et al. ; Esbenshade ; Locke ; Mosley ; Riisgaard ).
Fairtrade International draws directly on an empowerment agenda in seeking to improve conditions for disadvantaged small farmers and hired laborers in the Global South. An extensive literature examines Fairtrade's farmer certification (Bacon ; Jaffee ; Renard , ), with most studies documenting that important benefits accrue to small farmers (Nelson and Pound ) . Auld, Renckens, and Cashore () identify Fairtrade as an exemplar of empowerment-oriented certification. Yet researchers argue that as Fairtrade has gained mainstream market acceptance its farmer certification has shifted its focus from prioritizing the values and practices of partnership to those of traceability (Raynolds ) and control (Renard and Loconto ) . This research suggests that Fairtrade's efforts to empower small farmers are being eroded by its increasing adoption of compliance-based certification practices.
Although Fairtrade International has since its founding certified large enterprises, relatively little research examines its hired labor program. Raynolds () and Riisgaard () analyze Fairtrade labor certification's development and conventions. Others examine the implications of certification for plantation workers producing bananas in Latin American (Brown ; Frundt ), tea in Asia (Besky ; Makita ) and horticultural products in Africa (McEwan and Bek ). Although workers are generally found to benefit from certification (Nelson and Martin ) , research suggests that Fairtrade has had a harder time advancing empowerment for workers than for farmers. This article analyzes the experiences and challenges of Fairtrade International's hired labor certification system, investigating () the inclusive governance structures, () the participatory oversight systems, and () the enabling rights standards which scholars propose are central to a beyondcompliance approach.
Organization and Governance
European and North American NGOs founded Fairtrade International in  to harmonize their efforts to assist producers in the Global South by selling labeled products in the Global North. The umbrella NGO defines its mission as being "to connect disadvantaged producers and consumers, promote fairer trading conditions and empower producers to combat poverty, strengthen their position and take more control over their lives" (FTI a). This empowerment logic has guided Fairtrade's evolution, with the program emerging as the leading social certification of internationally traded agro-food products. Fairtrade markets have grown substantially, with annual retail sales reaching US$  billion ( Table ) . The program certifies coffee, tea, bananas, cocoa, sugar, honey, citrus, pineapples, mangos, apples, grapes, rice, quinoa, spices and herbs, fruit juices, flowers, wine, cotton, sports balls, and gold. Fairtrade remains primarily an agro-food certification, with coffee, tea, bananas, and cocoa generating most revenues (FTI c). Production of certified commodities has expanded across the Global South: , enterprises in  countries now produce Fairtrade goods. Fifty-six percent of enterprises have been certified for over three years (FTI a) .
The Fairtrade certification system comprises four related entities (FTI b). Fairtrade International defines program policies and sets standards for participating buyers and producers. An autonomous NGO, FLO-Cert, performs annual audits and certifies compliance. Twenty-two National Labeling Initiatives promote sales of labeled products in market countries. Three regional Producer Networks-in Africa, Asia, and Latin Americarepresent the farmers and workers who cultivate Fairtrade products. Relationships between these entities are characterized by intensifying control, evidenced most clearly in Fairtrade's increasingly technical standards and FLO-Cert's bureaucratic producer oversight (Raynolds ; Renard and Loconto ) . Yet Fairtrade International's governance structure reflects the strength and resilience of its empowerment commitments. In the early years, National Labeling Initiatives defined Fairtrade's trajectory, marginalizing the producers who were the program's stated beneficiaries, and prioritizing market growth. But over the past decade, the balance of stakeholder power has shifted as Producer Networks asserted their influence, workers gained increasing representation, and Labeling Initiative resistance to power sharing softened with Fair Trade USA's exodus from the international system (Raynolds ). In , Producer Networks gained voting privileges equal to Labeling Initiatives on Fairtrade's Board, which for the first time included a trade union president (FTI b).
Hired Labor Enterprises and Labor Certification
Fairtrade International has since its founding included two categories of producers who have often been at odds. Hired labor enterprises are those that rely primarily on paid workers, including medium and large farms, plantations, companies, and factories.

Small producer enterprises are cooperatives made up of small farmers who rely primarily on unpaid household labor.
 Small-farmer cooperatives, which helped establish Fairtrade, have resisted the incorporation of large enterprises, asserting that peasants represent the vanguard of sustainable development and deserve protection from plantation competition (Renard ) . Other stakeholders have disagreed, arguing that agricultural workers deserve support and that small farmers could not produce key products in sufficient quantities.  Since the majority of its founding Labeling Initiatives already included plantations, Fairtrade International incorporated both producer enterprise categories from the start. As the range and volume of Fairtrade-labeled products has grown, so has the role of hired labor enterprises. Although cooperatives and their allies have successfully barred plantations from coffee, cocoa, sugar, honey, rice, and cotton (Raynolds ), large and small enterprises produce other certified commodities. Between  and , large Fairtrade-certified enterprises increased from  to  and workers from , to , (FLO ; FTI a). Cooperatives and farmers outnumber plantations and workers, but in key products like tea, flowers, and bananas, Fairtrade plantations outnumber and far out-produce peasant cooperatives ( Table ) .
Fairtrade International operationalizes its equity and empowerment agenda through certification rules regulating production practices and producer-buyer relations. Basic expectations for all producers are the same: workers and farmers must be organized into democratic associations; production practices must uphold social and environmental criteria; and the Fairtrade Premium derived from buyer fees must be invested in local social development. Yet recognizing that promoting fairness for workers and for farmers entailed somewhat different approaches, Fairtrade International created two separate certification protocols: Hired Labor Standards and Small Producer Standards. Established in , the Hired Labor Standards were updated in  (FLO , ).
Critiques of Fairtrade International's hired labor program have mounted over the past decade, with scholars and activists raising serious concerns about the certification's efficacy in improving labor conditions. Studies of certified banana plantations in Latin America have raised questions about Fairtrade's ability to offset transnational corporate power and engage productively with unions (Brown ; Frundt ). In Asia's Fairtrade tea plantations, researchers have found persistent patron-client relations, limited seasonal-worker benefits, and a supplanting of local labor laws (Besky ; Makita ). Studies of African horticultural plantations have questioned Fairtrade's ability to oversee complex buyer-driven supply chains, bring significant gains, and ensure equal benefits across regions, commodities, and employment categories (Cramer et to National Labeling Initiatives, the historically conservative US representative was gone, and there was now a trade union leader-help explain this somewhat surprising board support. To operationalize its new strategic commitments, Fairtrade International fundamentally revised its Hired Labor Standards in  for implementation in . I analyze these standards below to reveal the interests they reflect, the priorities they reinforce, and the challenges they overlook.
F A I R T R A D E C E R T I F I C A T I O N A N D A U D I T I N G
Fairtrade International presents the new certification criteria in its -page "Fairtrade Standard for Hired Labour," identifying numerous "core requirements" linked to foundational program commitments that are prerequisites for participation (FTI c).
 These requirements stipulate that firms must support Fairtrade in principle and practice: incorporating this commitment in their mission statements and allocating administrative and worker time to program activities (FTI a). Following a third-party certification model, FLO-Cert audits participating enterprises for adherence to Fairtrade International's standards. Core standards require that participating enterprises facilitate oversight by granting certifiers access to firm information, owned and subcontracted facilities for scheduled and unscheduled audits, and all workers. FLO-Cert undertakes a physical audit of enterprises prior to certification, on a scheduled annual basis and through unscheduled visits, in each case incorporating document reviews as well as manager, worker organization, and individual worker interviews (FLO-Cert ). While these procedures undergird effective certification, they have proved insufficient to guarantee factory compliance (Esbenshade ).
Fairtrade acknowledges the limitations of traditional compliance procedures and explicitly supports a beyond-compliance approach in its New Workers' Rights Strategy, stating:
We want to move beyond the traditional CSR paradigm of social compliance based on standard-setting and auditing. While audits are a tool, Fairtrade's focus should be to help build the conditions whereby workers have the tools and ability to negotiate their own wages and terms of work. (FTI a:)
Adopting a central WRAC labor-advocate proposal for increasing worker participation, Fairtrade moves beyond the traditional compliance approach in now requiring that accessibly written annual audit reports be shared with workers (FTI a). This innovation increases workers' knowledge regarding certification expectations and enterprise compliance, and aligns with a labor-movement view that workers are the ones most able to provide continuous oversight (Anner ) . Although most Fairtrade stakeholders support further increasing worker engagement in certification (FTI ), more detailed guidelines are currently available only for textiles (FTI b).
Fairtrade's new standards tighten up existing grievance protocols, requiring that procedures be in place prior to certification, with workers represented on grievance committees and engaged in dispute resolution. Complementing the internal complaints system, workers, community members, and other stakeholders can submit complaints directly to FLO-Cert and in the second instance to Fairtrade International. Fairtrade requires that all allegations of noncompliance be investigated, with minor infractions addressed via corrective policies and major violations via enterprise sanctions and, if unremedied by a specified deadline, decertification (FTI d). Research suggests that engaging workers can strengthen compliance (ITC ), but it is hard to judge the effectiveness of Fairtrade's procedures since compliance reports are not public. What Fairtrade standards documents make clear is that while workers are involved in audit interviews, informed about audit results, and integrated into grievance systems, the program continues to rely largely on external oversight, rather than a participatory oversight model (Rodríguez-Garavito ).
Fairtrade International has wide-ranging standards "to ensure decent working conditions" (FTI a:), building on United Nations and International Labour Organization conventions. As noted in Table  , Fairtrade rules ban unequal treatment based on worker characteristics (including pregnancy and union membership) and abusive management practices (including sexual harassment). These anti-discrimination regulations were fortified in response to findings that women, migrant, and seasonal workers are often disadvantaged in Fairtrade (Nelson and Martin ) , as in other production arenas (Alkire et al. ) . Grievance procedures and retribution protocols bolster the rights of all workers, including those of union members, who legitimately fear retaliation in many countries (Anner ). Fairtrade's forced and child labor policies further reflect its rights-based commitments. Acknowledging that child labor remains prevalent in many areas of certified production (FTI b), Fairtrade strengthened rules restricting underage workers from entering worse forms of employment.
Fairtrade has extensive hiring, overtime, leave, health, and safety regulations. These stipulate that workers employed over three months have contracts; subcontracted workers perform only non-regular work; and workers know their employment conditions and rights. Rules regarding migrant and seasonal hiring and labor contracting (a common avenue for hiring contingent agricultural workers) have been tightened to address the widespread use of irregular workers in global production (Standing ), including Fairtrade (Nelson and Martin ) . Certification rules specify that workweeks not exceed  hours; overtime be voluntary, reasonable, and paid extra; paid annual, maternity, and sick leave exist; and regular and nursing breaks be provided. Except in mandating paid maternity leave, these regulations, which exceed legal protections for agricultural workers in most countries (FAO ), remained unchanged. Fairtrade standards address general occupational health and safety concerns (requiring medical officers and exams, health and safety committees, sickness and accident documentation, fire and first aid procedures, and worker training) as well as the specific hazards of chemical-intensive agriculture (detailing protective gear and equipment use, pesticide worker training and rotating, re-entry schedules, and work assignments). Since they surpass legal requirements in most producer countries (ILO ), Fairtrade's health and safety standards were largely unmodified (FTI b).
The most important change in Fairtrade's standards promoting decent work involve its new "living wage" protocols. Prior regulations remain that wages and benefits meet legal minimums, collective-bargaining agreements (CBAs), and regional averages; pay be timely and recorded; and deductions legal. Augmented rules stipulate that piece-rate workers earn (FTI d, b) . The Fairtrade International standards described above reveal and enact the program's goal of enhancing worker well-being. Most protocols focus on traditional, yet important, worker protections. Fairtrade's standards exceed legal requirements in many countries of the Global South; where they duplicate existing laws, they may, like other private standards, be able to bolster enforcement (Amengual and Chirot ; Berliner et al. ). Certified enterprise managers and workers, as well as other stakeholders, largely supported Fairtrade's workplace standards revisions, with new grievance procedures receiving particularly widespread backing (FTI ). Fairtrade managers' support for these augmented provisions may derive from their relatively easy compliance and verification and fit with prevailing management models (Renard and Loconto ) .
Some of the above standards, most importantly Fairtrade's new living wage requirement, go beyond protecting workers to fueling empowerment, fostering the enabling environment Rodríguez-Garavito () argues is essential for a beyond-compliance approach. As Miller 
F A I R T R A D E L A B O R R I G H T S A N D S O C I A L D E V E L O P M E N T S T A N D A R D S
Revised Fairtrade International standards support the New Workers' Rights Strategy's endorsement of unions. As the program manual states: "Fairtrade International promotes the rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining as the foundation of ensuring workers' rights, and considers independent and democratic trade unions the best means for achieving this" (FTI a:). While previous standards required hired labor enterprises to uphold core rights, they now require that firms promote labor rights. Table  outlines Fairtrade's freedom of association protocols, including prior criteria regarding union worker and workplace access, respect for worker representation, worker organization independence, and representational procedures. Three new tools recommended by WRAC were added to fortify these regulations: a Freedom of Association Protocol signed by management vowing support for workers' right to unionize, unions' workplace access, collective bargaining, and other labor rights; a Right to Unionize Guarantee provided in writing to all workers; and a Fairtrade-designated local labor rights contact available to advise workers. While these information/commitment tools do not ensure freedom of association, they address key barriers to unionization (Compa ). As Fairtrade suggests, its Freedom of Association Protocol seeks to overcome the acknowledged resistance to unionization by some certified firms; its Right to Unionize Guarantee and labor contacts seek to address workers' often limited knowledge and anxiety about organizing (FTI b). Although Fairtrade has always required that workers be democratically organized, prior rules allowed firm-based workers' committees to represent workers in non-unionized sectors. Following WRAC's union-member recommendations, the  standards promote unionization more forcefully, stipulating that non-unionized companies "must allow representatives of trade union organizations that represent workers in the sector or region to meet with workers on company premises" prior to certification, and when workers decide not to unionize, workers must (on their own) create a representative body (FTI a:, bold text in the original). In explaining these revisions, Fairtrade International advances trade unionist arguments made by WRAC members and unions involved in Fairtrade banana plantations (COLSIBA ), suggesting that workers' committees may threaten labor rights by fueling management co-optation and a parallel structure that can impede unionization, and that pro-unionization efforts are needed to create an enabling framework fostering labor rights (FTI c). Fairtrade requires that hired labor enterprises proactively seek a CBA within the first year. Standards mandate that firms uphold workers' rights to bargain collectively, bargain in good faith, and sign sectoral CBAs. What has changed is that when no CBA exists, managers "must proactively engage in a process to enter into a collective agreement," negotiating with a recognized union or other worker body (FTI a:, bold text in the original). Although this mandate is waived when workers decide not to unionize and non-union worker representatives are not legally authorized to bargain, Fairtrade specifies that such cases will be reviewed to identify any "intimidation or coercion" (FTI a:). In justifying its new proactive CBA measures and policing of waivers, Fairtrade echoes WRAC's report, acknowledging that managers often evade CBAs, which are rare in many sectors of certified production (FTI c).
The Fairtrade Premium Program, funded by buyer fees, supports services for workers, their families, and communities and lays "the foundations for empowerment and development" (FTI a:).
 Standards dictate how a Premium Committee (made up of elected worker representatives aided by a few company advisors) is to manage the worker-owned fund. Addressing labor-advocate concerns over potential management interference, new rules strengthen worker control over the premium and bar managers from allocation decisions (FTI c). The Premium Committee proposes projects, convenes an annual Workers' General Assembly to vote on funding priorities, and manages ongoing projects.
Regulations stipulate that funds be used to benefit workers and their communities, not to subsidize wages or other company costs. Prior standards prohibited direct payments to workers to avoid underwriting company wage bills. Yet  revisions allow workers to vote to disperse % of funds (% if migrant workers, who benefit little from community projects, predominate) as a cash or cash-equivalent (e.g., food box) bonus to all workers. Endorsing the logic of WRAC labor-advocacy members, Fairtrade explains its new standards as supporting workers' right to allocate funds as they see fit (FTI c). The certification standards outlined above advance Fairtrade's empowerment agenda through individual and collective capacity building, fueling the enabling rights Rodríguez-Garavito () endorses in his "empowered participatory labor regulation" model. One set of standards follows a trade unionist strategy of promoting empowerment through collective labor rights. This approach considers rights of association and collective bargaining as essential in themselves and in strengthening workers' ability to uphold other rights (Anner ; Compa ; Mosley ; Riisgaard ). Fairtrade has embraced this view, identifying unions as the most legitimate form of worker representation, requiring proactive support for unionization and CBAs, and introducing new tools supporting unionization. Yet implementation guidelines are lacking in a number of areas, including in outlining union collaboration and identifying local labor rights contacts. Managers of certified enterprises and many workers question Fairtrade's pro-union stance since in many producer countries unions are tied to political parties or have a reputation for usurping power from local workers (FTI :-), fears which scholars suggest may be well founded (Anner and Liu ). These concerns speak to the challenges in promoting worker empowerment on the ground and the contradictions in privileging unions over other forms of worker representation.
The second set of standards related to Fairtrade's Premium Program moves beyond a focus on labor rights to address broader citizens' rights. Advancing a development empowerment model (Utting ), the Premium Program works to foster individual and collective empowerment through education, health, credit, and other services selected by workers to benefit themselves, their families, and their communities. Research finds that premium projects bring important gains, although they cannot compensate for limited public investment in poor communities (Nelson and Pound ) . Workers acknowledge the Fairtrade premium's importance, and many are concerned that new individual payment rules might undermine collective long-term investments and permit companies to sidestep legal and Fairtrade remuneration obligations (FTI :). Fairtrade's long-term development efforts are critical, since certification gains are too often fleeting and confined to a few workplaces (Rodríguez-Garavito ) and strengthening civil society is essential for upholding rights around the world (Fox ).
F A I R T R A D E C E R T I F I C A T I O N I N C O M P A R A T I V E P E R S P E C T I V E
Comparing Fairtrade International's certification procedure and standards documents with those of other programs highlights their distinctive features, strengths and weaknesses, and implementation challenges. Since Fairtrade operates predominantly in agriculture, but has a growing factory presence, I include in this comparison two social standards systems which span agriculture and manufacturing-the Ethical Trading Initiative (Ethical Trading) and Social Accountability International (Social Accountability)-and two specializing in agriculture-the Rainforest Alliance / Sustainable Agriculture Network (Rainforest) and the Equitable Food Initiative (Equitable Food). Like Fairtrade, these programs are multi-stakeholder initiatives, operate in the Global South, and include multiple agricultural commodities.
 Yet program distinctions shape their comparability. Most importantly, the very large Ethical Trading has a code of practice but no certification; Rainforest includes social criteria but is primarily an eco-certification; and Equitable Food is very small, food safety focused, and not limited to the Global South (half of certified enterprises are in the US and Canada). Table  outlines the selected programs' characteristics, focusing on their governance, oversight systems, and labor standards. Analyzing program origins and governance structures helps reveal the institutional power of workers and program independence from corporate efforts to weaken labor commitments (Boström and Tamm Hallström ). NGOs, unions, and corporations co-founded Ethical Trading and Social Accountability. Although unions are defined as members, workers are not guaranteed board representation, and corporate members often override labor interests (Fransen ) . Rainforest and Equitable Food were, like Fairtrade, founded by NGOs. While formally independent, Rainforest is subject to influence from transnational corporate donors (Raynolds, Murray, and Heller ) , and neither workers nor their organizations participate in program governance. In Equitable Food, the balance of union/ farmworker organization and corporate representatives on the board helps support worker interests. In Fairtrade, Producer Networks represent workers (and farmers); although unions are stakeholders and have been engaged in recent policy decisions, their place in Fairtrade governance is not guaranteed. Most programs, like Fairtrade, rely on third-party certification, including audits by an external agency and stringent regulation. The exception, Ethical Trading, has in-house validation visits but no auditing, resulting in weak regulatory stringency (Fransen ) . While third-party certification helps identify problems, fixing them requires that firms be held accountable (Esbenshade , ) . Pursuing an important new approach, Equitable Food and Fairtrade enlist workers in maintaining accountability by giving them access to audit information. Effective grievance procedures are critical to accountability. Rainforest and Social Accountability rely on internal grievance procedures, requiring signed allegations and seeking enterprise-level resolution (through committees excluding workers) before engaging certification bodies. This internal bureaucratic approach helps address some issues, like health and safety problems, but rarely resolves labor rights violations, particularly in situations where workers fear retaliation (Anner ; Locke ). Equitable Food and Fairtrade have internal grievance procedures that incorporate workers, supplemented by external mechanisms for workers, community members, and others to register complaints directly with certification bodies. Equitable Food has an innovative telephone hotline for reporting violations. Fairtrade International and FLO-Cert solicit allegations directly (whether the new labor rights contacts accept complaints is unclear). Robust grievance procedures are necessary, but without effective sanctions and remediation, they are insufficient to maintain accountability. Fairtrade, Social Accountability, Rainforest, and Equitable Food decertify enterprises for major violations, but none use negative publicity to bolster accountability by identifying sanctioned or decertified programs.
Comparison of hired labor standard program characteristics
 For less egregious problems, these four programs seek remediation by creating new company policies or training programs, strategies that vary in their effectiveness (Anner ; Locke ). While Fairtrade and Equitable Food have introduced important innovations, the limitations of the systems used by all five programs support the observation that external oversight "is a blunt tool for implementing workers' rights" (Williams ).
All the programs studied have extensive workplace standards. Yet an analysis of criteria in  standard areas (see Table  , note b) finds that Ethical Trading and Rainforest have less extensive social protocols, including workplace protections, than the other programs.
 Fairtrade, Social Accountability, and Equitable Food have strong, relatively consistent employment and occupational health and safety standards, substantiating the view that these workplace protections are favored since they are easily monitored and remediated (Berliner et al. ) . Where Fairtrade and Equitable Food exceed Social Accountability is in protocols addressing the specific needs of women, ethnic-minority, and migrant/seasonal workers. Efforts to address the needs of these workers are commendable, since they are often disadvantaged in private regulatory programs (Barrientos and Smith ; Locke, Amengual, and Mangla ), yet there are very significant challenges in bringing improvements to workers who are socially and legally marginalized. Miller and Williams () argue that living wages represent a central arena for moving beyond enhancing worker well-being to advancing labor rights. All the programs studied require paying minimum wages. Equitable Food builds on this benchmark, requiring that wages in the Global South be . times the legal minimum. This innovative approach may raise the wage floor, but it does not close the gap between minimum and living wages, which can require wages over twice the legal minimum.
 Fairtrade is the only program that stipulates annual increases (negotiated by worker representatives) to close the gap between existing wages and living wage targets. Although Ethical Trading, Social Accountability, and (as of ) Rainforest reference living wage goals and offer guidance for reaching those targets, paying living wages is not required. The difficulties in making living wages a reality are significant, and providing guidance is likely insufficient. Yet the increasing incorporation of the living wage concept in major standards systems is important, since it bolsters labor rights norms in framing advocacy around decent work (Barrientos, Gereffi, and Rossi ; Berliner et al. ) and helps legitimate worker demands for higher remuneration (Miller and Williams ) . Rising acceptance of living wage goals also shows that high-bar programs like Fairtrade can push competing organizations to raise their standards (Ponte and Riisgaard ).

Ethical Trading, Social Accountability, and Rainforest seek largely to protect rather than to empower workers, as evidenced in their labor rights protocols. These programs do not require that workers negotiate terms of employment. The three initiatives stipulate that freedom of association be respected, although none requires that workers be represented; and of these three, only Social Accountability mandates that workers be advised of their right to organize. This programmatic focus on protecting, rather than empowering, workers is common among standards systems (Barrientos and Smith ; Locke ), and respecting freedom of association often means overlooking violations (Anner ; Esbenshade ). Fairtrade and Equitable Food espouse a more robust labor rights approach, requiring respect for associational rights, worker representation in employment negotiations, and that workers be apprised of their right to organize. Although Equitable Food does not require democratic worker organizations, it creates "leadership teams" including managers and elected or appointed worker representatives. This team-based capability-building strategy may help advance food safety and productivity, but it does not offer workers an independent voice or vehicle for collective empowerment. While Equitable Food's small size may allow it to foster labor rights, if it grows, it will likely face the challenges encountered by larger programs adopting a similar capability approach (Locke ) .
Of the programs analyzed, only Fairtrade adopts an empowerment approach to workers,  moving beyond a compliance and capability-building model by requiring progress toward a living wage, democratic workers' organizations, and a Fairtrade Premium supporting social development. Despite its strong labor rights standards, Fairtrade faces tremendous challenges in fostering worker rights in practice, particularly in the many areas of certified production with fragile trade unions and weak labor regimes (Berliner et al. ; Riisgaard ). Fairtrade's approach to fostering empowerment via worker organizations and labor rights, along with social development and citizenship rights, offers important synergies. While labor rights provisions may bring advances to workers within the workplace, the Fairtrade Premium may bolster the well-being and empowerment of broader communities. Enhancing the capacity of local citizens and community groups to pursue and claim their rights is a formidable task (Fox ) . Yet an increasing body of research (Anner ; Appelbaum and Lichtenstein ; Barrientos and Smith ; Esbenshade ; Locke ) suggests that private standards systems are unlikely to make significant gains without complementary support from public regulatory institutions which provide legal protections to workers and citizens more generally.
C O N C L U S I O N S
This article explains Fairtrade International's hired labor certification system, increasing our understanding of this important program, which is known largely for its small-farmer certification. The study extends Fairtrade scholarship by providing a systematic analysis of the program's large-enterprise certification and  labor standards. My findings contribute to central debates in this literature by challenging assertions that Fairtrade's plantation certification circumvents its equity commitments (Bacon ; Jaffee ; Renard ) and revealing how Fairtrade is working to strengthen its empowerment agenda in hired labor arenas.
The analysis contributes to the broader labor standards literature by situating the case of Fairtrade International within critiques of typical compliance-based labor standards programs (Locke ; Locke, Amengual, and Mangla ) and proposals regarding the need for voluntary programs to pursue a beyond-compliance empowerment approach rooted in () inclusive governance, () participatory oversight, and () enabling rights (Anner ; Barrientos and Smith ; Esbenshade ; Rodríguez-Garavito ). As I demonstrate, Fairtrade International is making important, but incomplete, advances in each area. () Workers have an increasing voice in Fairtrade governance, and labor advocates have been pivotal in forging the program's New Workers' Rights Strategy. However, the role of unions and other social groups is not secured, and these stakeholders are unlikely to be able to offset corporate interests if labor rights expectations cut significantly into corporate profits. () Fairtrade largely maintains a compliance-based oversight system, using bureaucratic certification and auditing to support conformity. Although new audit report sharing requirements can enhance workers' knowledge of infractions, this does not necessarily increase workers' ability to uphold program expectations. () Where Fairtrade shows the greatest strength is in its enabling rights standards. The program has extensive workplace criteria focusing on traditional, but important, worker protections, recently augmented particularly for vulnerable and irregular workers. Fairtrade's living wage requirements represent a key innovation in tackling financial insecurity and empowering workers. New regulations seeking to enhance workers' knowledge, via a Right to Unionize Guarantee and local labor rights contacts, and support unionization uphold a labor-advocacy view that associational rights are essential in themselves and in strengthening workers' ability to uphold other rights. Pursuing a broader development approach to advancing citizens' (as well as labor) rights, the Fairtrade Premium Program offers an important avenue for fostering well-being and empowerment beyond the workplace. I argue that given its incomplete beyond-compliance advances, Fairtrade represents a worker-enabling compliance program.
My comparative analysis highlights Fairtrade International's distinctive features and the shared challenges encountered by voluntary programs seeking to improve labor conditions in global agro-export production. This analysis confirms the innovative nature of Fairtrade's new living wage and union requirements and its established Premium Program. The comparison finds that Fairtrade provides the strongest worker-enabling protocols across governance, oversight, and labor standards areas. Yet other programs also have important strengths. In support of inclusive governance, some programs identify unions as members, offering worker organizations a clearer role than as stakeholders, as in Fairtrade. In enhancing participatory oversight, the Equitable Food Initiative has an anonymous hotline for reporting violations, a promising measure that Fairtrade and others could adopt given increasingly widespread phone access. To expand public accountability, all programs might consider identifying sanctioned and decertified enterprises. In bolstering enabling rights standards, the other programs provide Fairtrade few lessons; but Fairtrade's living wage efforts appear to be encouraging other programs to strengthen their wage expectations.
Although Fairtrade International has introduced important innovations in its labor certification program which fuel beyond-compliance inroads in key domains, Fairtrade, like other voluntary standards programs, faces critical challenges in implementing its standards and realizing its empowerment goals. Despite moves to increase participation in governance and oversight, Fairtrade remains largely a top-down certification that may be better able to inform workers of their rights than to guarantee those rights. Fairtrade's worker-enabling compliance approach diverges significantly from the "empowered participatory labor regulation" envisioned by Rodríguez-Garavito () in its continued reliance on external auditing and compliance. The central question regarding Fairtrade's strategy appears to be whether workers and their allies can harness certification practices to bolster local efforts to ensure labor and citizen rights, particularly in regions of the Global South with weak labor regimes and public institutions.
We need further field-based research to clarify the opportunities and obstacles facing a worker-enabling compliance model. To explain what Fairtrade's new standards mean on the ground, research should explore how program rules are interpreted and enacted and whether certification actually reshapes local labor regimes. This study suggests that Fairtrade certification may be able to shift local labor conditions in two key areas. First, Fairtrade's living wage efforts may provide a strategic avenue for improving wages in its certified enterprises (and potentially in those certified by other programs) and critical benchmarking tools for groups advocating for national minimum-wage increases. Second, Fairtrade's labor rights information and unionization provisions may encourage collective organizing in rural areas where unions are legal but uncommon. By supporting empowerment within and beyond the workplace, voluntary regulations like Fairtrade may be able to augment, even if they cannot replace, mandatory legal protections upholding labor and citizenship rights.
